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Defining the Limits of Free Exercise: The
Religion Clause Defenses in United
States v. Moon
By Debra A. Silverman*
Introduction
On July 16, 1982, a jury convicted Reverend Sun Myung Moon, the
founder and leader of the Unification Church, of filing false income tax
returns.' Specifically, the jury determined that Moon failed to report in-
terest that had accrued on Chase Manhattan Bank accounts held in his
name and income recognized when a company run by Church members
issued stock to Moon at no cost. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed that conviction fourteen months later' and
on May 14, 1984, the United States Supreme Court denied Moon's peti-
tion for certiorari.3
The Second Circuit recognized that Moon's culpability depended
upon his beneficial ownership of the bank accounts and the stock. Under
the government's theory, Moon owned the assets in his capacity as an
individual taxpayer. They were in his name, under his control, and had
been used for his personal investments and expenditures. Moon argued,
unsuccessfully, that the assets belonged to the tax exempt Unification
Church.a He asserted that the assets had been given to him in name only
by the followers of his religion, who intended that the assets be used for
that religion. Moon maintained that he embodied the Unification
Church, and merely held and administered the property for the Church's
* A.B., 1982, Princeton University; member, third year class.
1. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2344 (1984).
The jury also convicted Moon and a senior member of the Unification Church of conspir-
acies to file false tax returns and to obstruct the tax investigation.
2. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1216.
3. Moon v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984).
4. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1217.
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benefit.5
At first blush, this case appears to be a simple factual dispute-who
owned the assets, Moon or the Unification Church?6 After hearing the
evidence presented by both sides, the jury decided that Moon owned the
assets and therefore owed income taxes on the interest earned on the
bank deposits and on the value of the stock. The jury convicted him of
tax fraud for failing to report these assets.7 Why then, if this case turned
on a question of fact, did the defense attempt to obtain Supreme Court
review? This Comment examines just one of the complex and sensitive
issues that underlies United States v. Moon:8 the defense's objections to
the jury instructions based on the First Amendment guarantee of free-
dom of religion.' Part I discusses the defense's arguments. Part II re-
5. There was no dispute that if the Unification Church owned the assets, no income taxes
would be owed to the government. As a bona fide religion, the Unification Church is tax
exempt. Unification Church v. INS, 547 F. Supp. 623 (D.D.C. 1982). See also Holy Spirit
Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d
662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982) (granting the Unification Church tax exempt status under New
York law).
6. Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit disagreed with this characterization in a dissent to
the Moon opinion: "[T]his case did not involve a claim that an ordinary, lay taxpayer held
certain assets in a private trust for the benefit of another. On the contrary, the taxpayer here
was the founder and leader of a worldwide movement which, regardless of what the observer
may think of its views or even its motives, is nevertheless on its face a religious one, the mem-
bers of which regard the taxpayer [Moon] as the embodiment of their faith. Because Moon
was the spiritual leader of the church, the issue whether he or the church beneficially owned
funds in his name was not as crystal-clear as [it] might seem." 718 F.2d at 1242 (emphasis in
original).
7. Moon was sentenced to an eighteen month prison term and fined $25,000 plus costs.
Id. at 1216.
8. The appellate court opinion discussed the following issues: (1) whether denial of a
bench trial constituted a denial of the First Amendment right to free speech and the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient for conviction; and (3)
whether some jury instructions were erroneous. This Comment focuses on only one portion of
the third category.
9. The primary issue before the trial court was whether the Chase Manhattan Bank ac-
counts and the stock issued in Moon's name belonged to Moon. The trial judge instructed the
jury to consider a variety of factors: "In determining whether in 1973, 1974 and 1975 the
International Unification Church Movement existed and whether the Movement owned the
funds in the Chase accounts and Tong I1 stock or whether Reverend Moon owned them, you
should consider all the evidence, including such factors whether the Movement had a specific
organizational structure, written charter or constitution, the existence of other Unification
Church corporate entities during the relevant time period, the fact that the accounts were
maintained under Reverend Moon's name, the source of the funds, the intent of the parties
who caused the stock and funds to be transferred to Reverend Moon's name, evidence of any
agreements as to how the funds would be used, the manner in which the stock and funds were
administered and whether there is any evidence Moon ever accounted to anyone for the use of
the funds." 718 F.2d at 1244 n.3 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Moon argued that the jury should
only consider church members' beliefs to determine ownership of the assets. See infra notes
11-14 and accompanying text.
views traditional First Amendment analysis. Finally, Part III analyzes
the Second Circuit's opinion in detail.
I. Religion Clause Objections
The Supreme Court has said that religion clause problems must be
decided on a case by case basis: "Each value judgment . . . must...
turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or
interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing
so.' '"° In his petition to the Supreme Court, Moon attacked the jury
instructions on the ground that they violated his constitutional right to
religious freedom. By permitting the jury to consider a variety of fac-
tors to determine whether Moon or the Unification Church owned the
assets, the instructions 2 interfered with the religious practices of the
Unification Church.
According to the defense, church members believe that they contrib-
ute to their religious mission by transfering assets to Reverend Moon.
Since the appellate court held that the jury could reject church beliefs
about religious uses of church assets, the defense contended that the
court violated the Free Exercise Clause. Moon's counsel, Laurence H.
Tribe,13 argued that the jury instructions constituted a "lay veto [power]
of [a] religious decision," and an "anathema to the Religion Clauses."' 14
Focusing on principles of church autonomy, the defense urged that the
First Amendment prevents lay juries from second guessing the religious
intent of donor church members.
In broad terms, Moon poses two questions: 1) who decides what
activities constitute legitimate religious uses-the state or the particular
church, and 2) does it violate traditional notions of free exercise protec-
tion to allow the state to decide? In answering this two part inquiry,
Tribe urged that church autonomy and Reverend Moon's position as
leader of the Unification Church required state deference to church deci-
sions. 5 The Second Circuit rejected both arguments.' 6
A. Church Autonomy
The right to church autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause is the
right of churches to decide how to run their own institutions. But the
10. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
11. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1226-28.
12. See supra note 9.
13. Professor Tribe, a renowned constitutional law scholar, headed Moon's defense.
Moon, 718 F.2d at 1215.
14. Petition for Certiorari at 22, United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984).
15. Moon, 718 F.2d 1226-27.
16. Id. at 1227-28.
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general rule of autonomy is not absolute. 7 The key issue in Moon was
whether the autonomy principle forced the government to respect the
Unification Church's decision to permit Moon to hold and to use the
funds as he saw fit.
Relying on Jones v. Wolf, 8 the defense argued that the beneficial
ownership issue was actually a question of religious autonomy: how
should church authority and property be allocated? Jones prohibited civil
courts from interpreting religious doctrine in resolving intra-church
property disputes.' 9 The defense argued that a corollary of this "neutral
principles" approach prohibited lay juries from questioning allocation of
property within a church. The Second Circuit, however, rejected this ar-
gument and determined that the "neutral principles" approach had no
application to a case that pitted the government against an undivided
church.2°
Tribe ardently contested the appellate court's rejection of Jones.2'
Rather than limiting the "neutral principles" approach, Tribe advocated
expanding its applicability:
[R]espect for the decisions of churches and their members as to the
allocation of property and authority within a religious community
is not less but more essential where all those members share the
same view of the matter and it is the government that would substi-
tute its view for theirs.22
Since Moon and his followers believed that he held the assets for the
benefit of the Church,23 the jury could not challenge this intra-church
property allocation. Nevertheless, the appellate court refused to expand
the doctrine and found that the defense arguments overstated the scope
of protections afforded by the religion clauses.24
B. The Messiah Defense
Bona fide religions owe no taxes on church assets or church related
activities, 25 but the personal income of church leaders is taxable. An-
other key issue in Moon was whether Moon's position as "Messiah"26
meant that he, like his church, was tax exempt.
17. Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church La-
bor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. Rv. 1373, 1388 (1981).
18. 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (involving a dispute over church property ownership between
factions of a local congregation).
19. Id. at 602.
20. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1228.
21. Petition for Certiorari at 17-18, United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984).
22. Id. at 18.
23. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1226.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 5.
26. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227.
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The defense argued that Moon's followers believed that he personi-
fied the Unification Church and was indistinguishable from it.z7 Because
the trial court allowed the jury to treat Moon's property ownership "sec-
ularly"2 the court violated Moon's First Amendment rights.
The appellate court summarily dismissed this "Messiah" defense:
"The fact that Moon is the head of the Church does not mean that the
Church itself is not a distinct and separate body;"2 9 and rejected the
argument that any use of the funds by Reverend Moon was for religious
purposes.30 The Second Circuit did not question the sincerity of Moon's
or his followers' beliefs; rather, it simply found that Moon's use of the
money fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection.
II. Traditional First Amendment Analysis
A. Background: The Religion Clauses
The First Amendment proclaims: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ,3, For over two hundred years, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has offered a definition of "religion" or "church,"32 even
though the First Amendment mentions "religion," and protects practices
that are embodied in or identified with churches.33 Rather than attempt
a definition, the scope of religious protection has turned on the inclusion
or exclusion of specific claims.
Historically, the amendment breaks down into two components: (1)
the Establishment Clause and (2) the Free Exercise Clause.34 The Estab-
lishment Clause limits permissible governmental support for church con-
ducted activities.35 Its main objective, as construed by the Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman 6  "is to prevent . .. the intrusion of
[either state or religious institutions] into the precincts of the other ...




30. Id. at 1227-28.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 62 (1977).
33. It should be noted that not all church activity is sanctioned by the religion clauses.
Id. at 42.
34. Although this breakdown is convenient for analytical purposes, an internal tension
exists between the two clauses: "May a government remove burdens from, grant benefits to, or
make accommodations for the free exercise of religion without simultaneously promoting the
establishment of a religion?" Note, Constitutional Law: The Religion Clauses-A Free Rein to
Free Exercise?, 11 STETsoN L. REv. 386, 388 (1982). Despite this interrelationship, the
Supreme Court has set forth distinct guidelines for each clause. See infra notes 37, 39-41 and
accompanying text.
35. Note, supra note 34, at 389.
36. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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aration, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable bar-
rier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 7
Undeniably, taxation and tax exemption implicate governmental intru-
sion or support of religion."
The Free Exercise Clause limits permissible governmental interfer-
ence with religious practices. Since Cantwell v. Connecticut,39 courts
commonly distinguish the freedom to believe, which is absolute, from
the freedom to act, which is not absolute.' Although accurate, this dis-
tinction is not often relevant, because freedom to believe is rarely in-
fringed in this country. Almost all reported cases involve freedom to act
according to religious beliefs.41
One commentator has divided Free Exercise Clause protection into
three kinds of rights: (1) the bare freedom to carry on religious activi-
ties: to pray, to construct churches, and to hold services; (2) the right of
churches to conduct those activities autonomously: to select their own
leaders, to define their own doctrines, to resolve their own disputes, and
to run their institutions; and (3) the right of conscientious objection to
government policy.42 In each category courts have accepted some claims
and rejected others.43 Moon's objections to the constitutionality of the
jury instructions fall within the second category of free exercise protec-
tion-the right to church autonomy.
B. Supreme Court Approaches to the Free Exercise Clause
The question of governmental interference with "religious freedom"
has most often arisen in the context of challenges to state statutes. In the
past, the Supreme Court has taken two different approaches to statutes
that impose a burden on religious practices.'
In the 1961 case of Braunfeld v. Brown,as the Court upheld a statute
mandating Sunday as a day of rest despite its impact on non-Christians.
Orthodox Jews challenged the statute, alleging that it caused economic
injury because their religion forced them to close their businesses on Sat-
urdays as well. In rejecting plaintiffs' argument, the Court focused on
37. Id. at 614. The Court developed a three-part Establishment Clause test which accom-
modates the case by case nature of the inquiry. A statute may withstand an Establishment
Clause challenge only if it has both a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. In addition, it must not foster excessive governmental
entanglement with the religion. Id. at 612-13.
38. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970) (upholding the tax exempt
status of properties used solely for religious worship).
39. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
40. Id. at 303-04.
41. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
42. Laycock, supra note 17, at 1388-89.
43. Id. at 1388.
44. Note, supra note 34, at 390-93.
45. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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the legislation itself, rather than its impact on individuals. The opinion
emphasized that: "to strike down, without the most critical scrutiny,
legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of reli-
gion . . . would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legisla-
ture."46 Only two years later, however, the Court shifted its focus and
held that a state could not deny unemployment benefits to a person who
was fired because her religion forbade her to work on Saturday.4 7 In
Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court focused on the individual's inter-
est rather than the legislature's. While the Braunfeld Court examined
whether the statute was valid, the Sherbert Court weighed the statute's
burden on the individual against its benefits for the community.48
Although Sherbert did not overrule Braunfeld, the 1972 case of Wis-
consin v. Yoder49 indicated that the Sherbert balancing test enjoyed ma-
jority support. Yoder overturned convictions of Amish parents who kept
their children from school despite a state statute that required them to
attend until age sixteen. Yoder indicated, however, that courts should
only except religious groups from legislation if their beliefs are both con-
sistent and sincere.50
In Thomas v. Review Board,1 the Supreme Court expanded the
Sherbert/Yoder balancing approach to include more subtle burdens on
the free exercise of religion. In both earlier cases, the Court addressed a
central religious practice, and like Sherbert, Thomas involved the denial
of unemployment benefits. Yet here, the state denied benefits because
Thomas quit his job after he was shifted into work that his religion pre-
vented him from performing. The statute disqualifying him from benefits
made no religious practice illegal.52 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the denial of unemployment benefits imposed an indirect burden on his
free exercise rights:
Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise
of religion [citations omitted]. The determination of what is "reli-
gious" belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and deli-
cate task. . . . However, the resolution of that question is not to
turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice
46. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
47. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
48. Id. at 402-06.
49. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. Id. at 216. The Court emphasized the traditional Amish lifestyle: "We see that the
record. . . abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group, and intimately related to daily living." Id.
51. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
52. IND. CODE §§ 224-1-1 to 22-4-38-3 (Supp. 1978). "[U]nder Indiana law, a termina-
tion motivated by religion is not for 'good cause' objectively related to the work." Thomas,
450 U.S. at 713.
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in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consis-
tent, or comprehensible to others to merit First Amendment
Protection.
53
Thomas may be viewed as the highpoint of free exercise protection for
indirect burdens on religious practices. One year later, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Lee, 4 refused to expand this First Amendment
protection to encompass the payment of taxes.
In United States v. Lee, the government's need to collect revenues
justified a limitation on religious freedom.55 Although the Court ac-
cepted that the Amish faith forbids both the payment and receipt of so-
cial security benefits, it held that the Free Exercise Clause did not exempt
members of the Old Amish from paying social security taxes. The Court
reached its conclusion by applying the Thomas balancing formula: "Not
all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. . . . The state may justify a
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accom-
plish an overriding governmental interest."56 The Lee Court balanced
the government's interest in maintaining an effective social security sys-
tem against the Amish's bona fide beliefs, and exacted the tax despite
their sincerity.57 The Court concluded that "[b]ecause the broad public
53. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713-14.
54. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
55. Id. at 259-60. This governmental interest has been a formidable opponent to religion
clause challenges in the past. In a series of cases, the tax court systematically denied tax
exempt status to "religious" organizations when the church in question served the private
purposes of the minister. See Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 507 (1980); Southern Church of Universal Bhd. Assembled, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 1223 (1980); Southern Church of Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1
(1981); Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531 (1980).
These cases represent private tax avoidance schemes. But unlike the Unification Church, the
organizations in question were not bona fide religions. See supra note 5.
56. Thomas, 455 U.S. at 257-58 [citations omitted].
57. But cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). In Ballard, the Supreme Court
upheld a criminal conviction of leaders of the "I am" movement. The Ballard family was
prosecuted for using and conspiring to use the mails to defraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 88 and 338.
The Ballards claimed to have supernatural powers. Based on this claim, they attracted follow-
ers and appealed for contributions from the public by mail. The government charged that the
Ballards "well knew" that their claims were false, and promulgated them only to defraud.
Although the trial judge instructed the jury that they could not assess the truth or falsity of the
Ballard's teachings or beliefs, but only their sincerity, the jury convicted them. The trial judge
instrncted the jury as follows: "The religious views espoused by [the Ballards] might seem
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before
a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious
beliefs of any sect. When the trier[s] of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden do-
main." Id. at 87.
It appears that in Moon, the trial court obeyed Ballard's warning, since it did not allow
the jury to pass judgment on the validity of the Unification Church members' belief that Moon
embodied the Church. It simply instructed the jury to determine whether Moon held the
funds for the Church's benefit. The issue of sincerity now appears to be moot as a result of
Lee. Although the Court recognized the sincerity of the Amish's belief, the belief could not
UNITED STATES V. MOON
interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, reli-
gious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for
resisting the tax.""8
The decision in Lee exemplifies the Court's recent use of the tradi-
tional balancing test to allow an infringement on religious freedom.
Clearly, the Supreme Court considers the Internal Revenue Code as a
limitation on even sincere religious beliefs.
III. The Second Circuit's Opinion
The appellate court began its analysis with a broad and abstract defi-
nition of religion: "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation
to whatever they may consider the divine."59 The court reasoned that
the religion clauses protect an individual's right "to entertain such
view[s] respecting his relations to what he considers the divine and the
duties such relationship imposes as may be approved by that person's
conscience. . . ."I But the appellate court highlighted limitations on
religious freedom, and concluded that Moon's objections fell outside the
scope of protection.
The Second Circuit set forth the basic principle that the First
Amendment does not immunize against the commission of a crime:
'It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be
invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society [cita-
tions omitted]' '. . . however free the exercise of religion may be, it
must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country ... .,61
The source of this basic tenet is the 1890 Supreme Court decision in Da-
vis v. Beason.62 In a later case, Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States,63 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Davis reasoning and
concluded that courts may analyze church activities to determine
whether those activities violate the Internal Revenue Code. 6
The issue in Christian Echoes was whether a religious organization
overcome the overriding governmental interest in supporting and maintaining the social secur-
ity system.
58. Thomas, 455 U.S. at 260.
59. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting W. JAMES, THE
VARnrIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1910)).
60. Id.
61. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (quoting Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890)).
62. 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890) (upholding an Idaho statute prohibiting bigamy and
polygamy).
63. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
64. Id. at 854.
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was entitled to tax exempt status.6 5 Although a substantial part of the
organization's activities involved influencing legislation and participating
in political campaigns, 66 the district court accorded the Christian Echoes
Church tax exempt status. Because church members sincerely believed
that their involvement in the political arena was religiously motivated,
the trial court felt it lacked the power to determine whether these activi-
ties were religious or political.67
The appellate court stated that it knew of no legal authority that
would support the district court's conclusion. 68 Rather, the Tenth Cir-
cuit determined that the First Amendment right of free exercise of reli-
gion permits restraints or limitations on church activites, 69 and found
that the Internal Revenue Service imposed an appropriate limitation.
In Moon, the defense argued that Christian Echoes should not con-
trol. Instead, the defense urged that Holy Spirit Association for the Unifi-
cation of World Christianity v. Tax Commission70 was the proper
authority. Holy Spirit considered whether certain property owned by the
Unification Church was exempt from taxation under New York state
law.7 1 The New York Court of Appeals held that courts may not inquire
into the content of church doctrines and teachings in determining
whether a church is organized and conducted for exclusively religious
purposes. It ruled that courts must accept a church's characterization of
its own beliefs and activities as long as the characterizaton is made in
good faith and is not a sham. 72 The New York Court of Appeals formu-
lated the inquiry as follows: "When. .. particular purposes and activi-
ties of a religious organizaton are claimed to be other than religious, the
civil authorities may engage in but two inquiries: Does the religious or-
ganization assert that the challenged purposes and activities are religious,
and is that assertion bona fide?" 73 Because Moon asserted that the alloca-
tion of property within the Unification Church was controlled by reli-
gious precepts, pursuant to Holy Spirit, the court only needed to ask one
65. The Internal Revenue Code holds as conditions for religious exemption that "no part
of the net earnings [of a religions organization]" may inure "to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities" may consist of "carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation," or "participat[ing] in, or in-
terven[ing], in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (1967).
66. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 853.
67. Id. at 856.
68. Id. The Tenth Circuit added: "Such conclusion is tantamount to the proposition that
the First Amendment right of free exercise of religion. . . protects those exercising the right
to do so unfettered." Id.
69. Id. at 856-57.
70. 55 N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
71. Id. at 512, 435 N.E.2d at 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
72. Id. at 519, 435 N.E.2d at 663-64, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 293-94.
73. Id. at 521, 435 N.E.2d at 665, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
question: was Moon's claim that he held the assets for the benefit of the
Church bona fide?
According to the defense, the answer would be an uncontestable yes.
Unfortunately for Moon, the appellate court never addressed whether
Moon's belief was bona fide. It dismissed Holy Spirit as inapposite, stat-
ing that it did not serve as precedent in a federal criminal tax prosecu-
tion.74 This interpretation is reasonable because the Holy Spirit court
distinguished Christian Echoes on the ground that the Internal Revenue
Code section relied on by the Tenth Circuit in Christian Echoes differed
from the New York statute it interpreted.75
In Moon, as in Christian Echoes, the court determined that the In-
ternal Revenue Code limited Free Exercise Clause protection. The Moon
court concluded that even if the jury were bound to accept church mem-
bers' beliefs as sincere, the jury was nonetheless free to decide whether
Moon as an individual beneficially owned the assets.76
The court also rejected the "Messiah" defense. Moon had argued
that as the embodiment of the Unification Church, he was indistinguish-
able from it. Consequently, since the Church could owe no taxes on in-
come derived from church related activities, by logical extension, neither
could Moon.77
The Second Circuit, however, had.no difficulty separating Moon's
spiritual identity as the leader of his religion, from his'legal identity as a
taxpayer. While legally a church may hold property free from govern-
mental interference, property held individually and used personally gives
rise to taxable income.7" "To allow otherwise would be to permit church
leaders to stand above the law, a view we have previously rejected."'79
Earlier in the Moon decision, the court methodically examined the evi-
dence and determined that Moon used the assets in a personal manner.8 0
By looking at the substance of the property arrangement within the Uni-
74. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227.
75. The Court of Appeals of New York stated: "We are not here concerned with whether
the Legislature has authority, should it choose to do so, to deny exemption to an organization
whose purpose is primarily religious but which as part of its religious program devotes a sub-
stantial portion of its activities to political objectives. It suffices for our present purposes to
note that section 421 (subd I par[a]) includes no such provision." 55 N.Y.2d at 523, 435
N.E.2d at 665-66, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
76. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227.
77. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
78. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1228.
79. Id.
80. Moon purchased $80,000 worth of stock for himself with the funds from one of the
Chase Manhattan Bank accounts. He also loaned a Unification Church organization (HSA-
UWC) $175,000 of which only $70,000 was repaid to him. HSA-UWC deducted the balance
as a personal contribution to Moon. For more detail and additional examples of Moon's usage
of the property at issue, see id. at 1220-22.
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fication Church rather than its form, the appellate court rejected defend-
ant's Messiah argument.
The Second Circuit did not analyze Moon's religious objections in
terms of traditional free exercise protection. It did not apply the Sher-
bertlYoder balancing approach or discuss the validity of Moon's objec-
tions in light of United States v. Lee. Nevertheless, in effect, Moon's
interest in free exercise protection of this church's autonomy was pitted
against the federal government's compelling interest to collect revenues.
Under Lee, the government's interest must prevail.81 By focusing on
some of the limitations on the Free Exercise Clause, the Second Circuit
rejected Moon's arguments and implicitly determined that his belief re-
garding the use of church funds was not "rooted in religion."82 This re-
sult is consistent with traditional free exercise protection.
IV. Conclusion
One scholar has proposed that: "When the state interferes with the
autonomy of a church and particularly when it interferes with the alloca-
tion of authority and influence within a church, it interferes with the very
process of forming the religion as it will exist in the future."83 The
Supreme Court has not yet passed on a claim where the government in-
terfered with the autonomy of a church to such an extent as to affect the
future structure of that religion, but it has recognized a right to church
autonomy in a series of cases involving disputes over church property,
church organization, and entitlement to ecclesiastical office.84
However, if one asks whether Moon's conviction for tax fraud will
affect the Unification Church as a religion in the future, the answer seems
81. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
82. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 713; see also supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
83. Laycock, supra note 17 at 1388.
84. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 595 (1979).
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Illinois
Supreme Court had set aside a church diocese's decison to defrock one of its bishops. The
Illinois court concluded that the defrockment was "arbitrary" because it did not comport with
the church's constitution or penal code. In addition, the Illinois court determined that a reor-
ganization of the diocese was invalid because it was done without approval of the mother
church.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois court on the ground of church
autonomy: "[T]he Illinois Supreme Court relied on purported 'neutral principles' for resolving
property disputes which would 'not in any way entangle this court in the determination of
theological or doctrinal matters.' Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Illinois substituted its
interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother Church constitutions for that of the highest ecce-
siastical tribunals in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation. This the
First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid." Id. at 721 [citations omitted]. See also Kedroffv.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (religious freedom encompasses the "power [of
religious bodies] to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church gov-
ernment as well as those of faith and doctrine").
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to be an obvious "no." Although the church's financial structure might
change, Moon's followers are still free to believe Moon personifies their
religion. Moon and the Unification Church members may continue to
regard Moon as the spiritual embodiment of their church; only when
Moon acts as the financial embodiment of the church does he run afoul
of the Internal Revenue Code and thus fall outside the scope of protec-
tion afforded by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, the Cantwell balance is
preserved."5
As noted earlier, Tribe would extend the autonomy accorded to in-
tra-church disputes to include disputes between the government and a
unified church.8 6 By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court avoided ex-
panding the Jones "neutral principles" approach. It also avoided apply-
ing the Sherbert balancing test, as refined by Yoder and Thomas, 7 to
assess Moon's First Amendment challenge. The Supreme Court's elected
silence suggests that the overrriding governmental interest to collect rev-
enue outweighs an individual church's right to allocate property however
it chooses. As a general principle, "churches are being called upon to
reveal more about their finances and to subject their property holdings,
investments, and solicitation procedures to more stringent public scru-
tiny.""8 Many religious groups fear that by imposing this higher level of
scrutiny, the government improperly impinges the free exercise of
religion.8 9
It is questionable whether the drafters of the First Amendment in-
tended the Free Exercise Clause to protect religious groups from Internal
Revenue Service scrutiny. According to one scholar, the authors "were
willing to take a calculated risk rather than give the government the re-
sponsibility of investigating, supervising, and-in consequence-sponsor-
ing and controlling, the practitioners of religion." 90 Yet the First
Amendment Framers never intended that the right to religious free exer-
85. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note that the balancing test developed in a series of cases involving
established religions with long histories of practice in the United States-Seventh Day Advent-
ists in Sherbert, Old Order Amish in Yoder and Jehovah's Witness in Thomas. Although the
Unification Church has been recognized as a bona fide religion, see supra note 5, it has not been
accepted as an established religion. Cf. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1242 (2d Cir.
1983) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (urging that the Unification Church Movement is religious "re-
gardless of what the observer may think of its views or even its motives").
88. Schwartz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Render unto
Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50, 51 (1976).
89. The following organizations submitted amicus briefs in support of Moon to the U.S.
Court of Appeals: National Council of the Churches of Christ; American Baptist Churches;
United Presbyterian Church; African Methodist Episcopal Church; Center for Law and Reli-
gious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society; Unitarian Universalist Association; National
Black Catholic Clergy Caucus; American and New York Civil Liberties Unions.
90. KELLEY, supra note 32, at 39.
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cise be absolute. Nor could they anticipate the present public policy gov-
erning the payment of personal income tax. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit determined that Moon did not merit First Amendment protec-
tion, and by denying certiorari, the Supreme Court tacitly agreed.
